Introduction
Taxes and quotas of tradable pollution permits are two important and intensively studied economic instruments for pollution control. This paper is concerned with the comparison of taxes and permits when the regulatory authority and the polluters have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and when environmental damages are due to a pollutant that accumulates. At each period of time, the regulator chooses the type and the level of the instrument that maximises a welfare functional depending on the expected flow of production minus damage costs, taking in account the expected answer of the polluters to the chosen environmental policy.
We depart from the literature concerned by this subject (a.o. [3, 2, 4, 5] ) by allowing the possibility of switching between instruments at each period, by considering finite as well as infinite horizon frameworks, and by considering a more general formulation of the regulator's objective and of the pollutant accumulation.
We do not restrict ourselves to the infinite horizon case studied in the above-mentioned literature where the choice of the instrument appears to be constant through time, and we show in the finite horizon case that permits are decided for a while, followed by decisions of taxes for all the remaining periods.
The model
The model has both continuous and discrete time features. t is the continuous time variable (0 t H ), which is divided in periods of length h, which are indexed by the discrete time index i (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I }, with h = H/I ). The regulator chooses the instrument and its level at the beginning of each period i, and keeps this level constant for the whole period.
To this end, one must estimate the reaction of the polluting firms:
The polluting firm reaction
At each step i, the representative polluting firm is assumed to maximise a quadratic profit functional involving
in which az − bz 2 /2 is the firm's production function, where z is the polluting factor of production (for example, emissions linked to energy), a i is the realization at period i of a, a discrete i.i.d. random process with mean and variance 2 , and b is a positive constant. i is either the level of the tax chosen by the regulator or the observed price of permits at period i. In problem (1), it is assumed that the representative firm does not take account of the future, because it is too small to influence the aggregate stock of pollutant, and thus has no power to influence the future environmental policy. The firm is thus unable to manipulate the future decisions of the regulator, so that its profit maximisation problem is solved at any time by
If the chosen instrument at step i is a tax, the behaviour of the firm is described by (2) . If the chosen instrument are permits, then whatever the random shock a i , their price will adjust so that the demand of permits by polluters equals the quantity of permits supplied by the regulator, x i . In that case,
Remark that the values of i or x i will be determined by the regulator as solutions of an optimization problem. And the decision to order tax or permits is also a part of the solution.
Let be a binary decision variable determining the type of the instrument (tax or permits), with = 0 if permits are chosen and = 1 if a tax is chosen. Let x = E{z} be the expectation of z. Given (2) and (3), x can be taken as the decision variable determining the level of the instrument (the level of the tax or the quantity of permits), whether this instrument is a tax or a quota.
We summarize both (2) and (3) as
where the unknowns for the ith period are i and x i . If i = 0 (permits), x i must be understood as x i ; if i = 1 (tax), x i means ( − i )/b, i.e., i will be recovered as − bx i .
The stock of pollutant
We suppose that the evolution of the stock of pollutant
where 
A typical instance of (5) results when S(t) is a solution of the differential equation
where is the rate of decay of the stock of pollution ( > 0) and where the number of firms has been normalized to 1.
, we solve immediately (6) as
The regulator's decision
The stock of pollutant S(t) results in damages to society that are equal to S 2 (t)/2, where is a positive parameter. At the beginning of each step i (i.e., when t
, that is before observing the current and future random shocks a j (j = i, . . . , I ), but knowing however their mean and variance, the regulator chooses the type and the level of the instrument that maximise the expected flow of payoffs defined as the difference between production and damages S 2 /2, subject to the behaviour of the polluters (described by (2) or (3)) and to the stock equation (6) . At step i, the regulator solves the following dynamic programming problem:
subject to (5), and to (4) giving z(t) in the ith period, with V I +1 (S H ) = 0, and where we only require F i to be a linear positive functional involving functions on [i − 1]h < t < H , and submitted to the condition (10) below.
A typical example of what we have in mind is an integral
where r is the exogeneous (positive) discount rate, but other forms have been considered (see examples later on).
We also suppose that the functionals F i and F i+1 are related by
where
In our example (9), F(f ) = h 0 f (t)e −rt dt, and = e −rh . We then have F(1) = (1 − e −rh )/r, from (7),
Using such expressions in the subsequent discussions should soon be an absolute nightmare. That is why we shall keep the F notation in further calculations as far as possible. Our theory is therefore able to cope with several formulas. As a second example, Hoel and Karp use in [3] an elementary integration formula When the horizon is infinite, we have taxes or permits for all the periods, depending only on the ratio /b, whether it is smaller or larger than * .
Optimal solution
Proof.
(1) We first look at how the decision has to be taken with respect to the last period i = I . We perform the calculation of (8), using (5), and knowing that a and x (and therefore z) are constants on (t I −1 , t I ) = (H − h, H ):
which shows already that the result will be a quadratic polynomial in S I −1 . We now compute the mathematical expectation in (8) , knowing that a I is a value of a random variable of mean and variance 2 , and, from (4), E{z I } = x I , E{a I z I } = E{a I x I + I (a 2 I − a I )/b} = x I + I 2 /b, and
Maximizing with respect to x I , i.e., by putting
one finds the required quadratic polynomial in S I −1
The complete solution of (8) at the final period is
We emphasize the quadratic character of the function V I by writing (13) as
(borrowing a notation of [3] ). Remark that
is negative: as F is a positive linear functional, F( ) is a scalar product. The sign of the coefficient of I in (13) tells if tax or permit will be decided for the last period, i.e., whether
In the simple case where
And if F(f ) = f (0), I = ∞ (always tax during the last period). (2) We come now to the general problem (8) for an intermediate period ([i − 1]h, ih).
We will show by induction that a quadratic expression similar to (14), i.e.,
holds at the i + 1th period. Therefore, using (10),
as all the parameters have been settled in F i+1 .
Assuming (16), we proceed as above in looking for the maximum of E{F i }.
Maximum is reached at
resulting in
We confirm therefore the inductive step from (16)
where we only look at the i 2 term in
so that we also will have to care for
which shows that the 2 's, and therefore the R i 's in (19) , are rational functions of /b. (3) We proceed now with a close inspection of (20) in order to discuss the positive root i of R i ( /b) = 0, so to determine the value of the ratio /b which will trigger tax or permits during the ith step: (a) We work (20) , showing that
2 is actually a rational function of first degree of
the function is (t) := (h) (t) − (h) (t).
We already see that all the
2 's are negative when i I , as
= 0, and as the numerator of (21) 
We now proceed with the simple fraction expansion of (21):
showing (see Fig. 1 ) that
2 is a nondecreasing function of
. Therefore, the sequence 0=
· · · is a nonincreasing nonpositive one, converging through an elementary iteration process towards the negative root If needed, we can get a more quantitative description of the sequence of the
2 's. Indeed, with (22) written as
Such continued fractions with constant elements are easily evaluated through powers of the roots of r 2 − (C + A)r + B 2 = 0 [1, Section 123, p. 501], say, r 1 and r 2 . Then, the relevant combination is soon found to be Finally, as R i < R i+1 , i < i+1 , (see Fig. 2 ), which ends the proof of the theorem.
Examples
With the integral form of F from (9) above, and = 0.005, r = 0.03 (found in [3] ) in (7), we are able to compute some values of R i ( /b) (actually, R i /F(1)) when h = 10. Recall that R i < 0 means that permits will hold for the period (i − 1)h < t < ih, and that tax will be chosen if R i > 0. We now look at values of i , i.e., the ratio /b separating permits from tax, for various values of h. The value * corresponds to infinite horizon. We also show * (H K) as calculated by Hoel and Karp [3, formula (15) For an empirical illustration of pollution control in the framework of climate change, Hoel and Karp [3] give two estimates of /b which are 0.0000137 and 0.00002. For all the values of h, r, and considered here, the tables above show that these estimates are largely lower than * , indicating that the regulator will choose the tax in all cases.
It is interesting to look at analytic formulas for small h, as done in [3] . Then, (t) ≈ 1 and (t) ≈ t, so, F(1) and F( 2 ) ≈ h, F(
2 ) ≈ h 3 /3, etc. from (20) , With simpler formulas, such as in [3] , F(f )=F (1) 
